
James D. Lee, Bar No. 011586 Senior Bar Counsel State Bar of Arizona 111 West Monroe, Suite 1800 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-1742 Telephone (602) 340-7247



# BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,

No. 00-2172

HARRY P. FRIEDLANDER, Bar No. 005244 TENDER OF ADMISSIONS AND AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT

Respondent.

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This agreement is entered into between the State Bar of Arizona, which is represented by undersigned bar counsel, and respondent, who is not represented by counsel. It is submitted pursuant to Rule 56(a), Ariz.R.S.Ct., and the guidelines for discipline by consent issued by the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Respondent conditionally admits he engaged in conduct that violated ER 1.15(a), Rule 43(a) & (d), Ariz.R.S.Ct. (Guidelines 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.c. and 2.e.), and Rule 44(b)3, Ariz.R.S.Ct., as more fully set forth below.

Subject to review and acceptance by the Disciplinary Commission and the Supreme Court of Arizona, respondent agrees to accept imposition of censure, one (1) year of probation (including participation in fee arbitration, if appropriate, and the State Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP), as set forth more specifically below), and payment of the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. Restitution, if appropriate, will be addressed through the fee arbitration component of probation.

## **FACTS**

## **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

1. At all times relevant hereto, respondent was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona, having been admitted to practice law in Arizona on April 22, 1978. In addition to respondent's admission in Arizona, he was admitted to practice law in Illinois in 1974, and in Virginia and the District of Columbia in 1962.

## COUNT ONE (File No. 00-2172)

- 2. Sylvia Cannon ("Cannon"), acting pro per, filed a lawsuit against Cigna Healthcare of Arizona on or about December 7, 1998 ("the lawsuit").
- 3. Cannon retained respondent on or about May 18, 1999, to represent her in the lawsuit.

- 5. Respondent represented Cannon at an arbitration hearing, and on or about September 27, 2000, obtained an award in Cannon's favor in the amount of \$4,049.23.
- 6. Although there is disagreement about how the representation ended, a Maricopa County Superior Court judge permitted respondent to withdraw as Cannon's counsel on or about October 25, 2000.
- 7. Respondent did not depose the expert witness or call him to testify at the arbitration hearing because he believed his testimony would not be favorable to Cannon. Despite that fact, respondent continued to hold the funds Cannon had paid him for those purposes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Respondent asserts that Cannon discharged him as her counsel on or about October 4, 2000, but Cannon asserts she never terminated respondent's representation of her.

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At some point following the arbitration hearing, Cannon retained the 8. services of attorney Arthur McBrayer ("McBrayer") to communicate with respondent and recover any unused funds that respondent should have returned to her. On or about October 12, 2000, respondent informed McBrayer that he believed he still had at least \$6,000.00 of unused funds belonging to Cannon in his trust account.

- On or about October 17, 2000, respondent provided an accounting and 9. a \$5,769.00 trust account refund check (#2610) to Cannon. Cannon deposited or cashed that check on or about October 23, 2000.
- 10. Respondent failed to inform Cannon that a hearing had been rescheduled, causing her to make an unproductive trip into Phoenix from Wickenburg, Arizona.
- 11. Due to the fact that respondent never deposed an expert witness on Cannon's behalf, he should have had at least \$2,769.002 in his trust account between November 17, 1999 (the date \$2,000.00 was deposited into his trust account by Cannon), and March 22, 2000 (the day prior to respondent's deposit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The \$2.769.00 amount is based on respondent's eventual refund to Cannon. At the very least, the amount respondent should have had in his trust account was \$2,000.00, which was the amount Cannon had paid respondent to depose an expert witness, but which did not occur.

of \$3,000.00 from Cannon), and at least \$5,769.00<sup>3</sup> in his trust account between March 23, 2000, and October 17, 2000.

- 12. On or about October 13, 2000, Cannon requested her file from respondent. Cannon asserted she received an incomplete file. According to Cannon, respondent failed to return deposition transcripts of the following individuals: Sylvia Cannon, Mary Alice Maxey, Yvonne Sposito and Dr. Kim. Respondent, on the other hand, asserted he never received one or more of the deposition transcripts, submitted one or more of the transcripts into evidence at the arbitration hearing, and returned one or more of the transcripts to Cannon.
- 13. Respondent's written fee agreement with Cannon included a "non-refundable, fully earned retainer" of \$5,000.00 that was to be credited toward any contingency fee that might be earned as a result of a favorable judgment in the lawsuit. The intended meaning of the fee agreement was not clear to Cannon, who believed she would receive a partial refund of the \$5,000.00 fee if respondent failed to obtain an award on her behalf of at least \$15,000.00.
- 14. Respondent failed to maintain trust account records that were current.

  As a result, respondent was unable to determine the balance in his trust account

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The \$5,769.00 amount is based on respondent's eventual refund to Cannon. At the very least, the amount respondent should have had in his trust account was \$5,000.00, which was the total amount Cannon had paid respondent to depose an expert witness and have him testify as such at an arbitration hearing, neither of which occurred.

at any time or the identity of clients or third parties for whom he was required to hold funds in trust.

- 15. Respondent's trust account records indicate a negative balance for several clients. The negative balance in respondent's records resulted from some incorrectly entered expenses (e.g., photocopying and long distance telephone charges) into his billing program. Respondent's trust account records also contained other errors that resulted from inaccurate or incorrect entries for payments made or received.
- 16. Respondent's check register reflects deposits and check numbers that were out of sequence for the date on which the activity allegedly took place.
- 17. Respondent transferred \$350.00 to his general account on or about February 17, 2000, without using a pre-numbered check.
- 18. The balance in respondent's trust account varied during the period between November 17, 1999 and October 17, 2000. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$4,174.56 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between November 17, 1999 and December 19, 1999. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$3,933.75 on November 17, 1999, \$3,188.75 between November 18, 1999 and November 21, 1999, and \$3,088.53

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The bank balances set forth in this paragraph reflect the balance in respondent's trust account at the end of the business day, as reflected by monthly statements received from the bank at which the trust account was located.

 on November 22, 1999. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$4,174.56 between November 23, 1999 and December 19, 1999.

- 19. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$4,005.81 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between December 20, 1999 and February 2, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$4,005.81 between those dates.
- 20. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$3,591.01 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between February 3, 2000 and March 22, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$3,591.01 between those dates.
- 21. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$6,591.01 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between March 23, 2000 and May 2, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$2,574.63 on April 17 & 18, 2000, \$5,457.63 between April 19, 2000 and April 23, 2000, \$6,007.63 on April 24, 2000, \$5,727.63 on April 25, \$4,978.32 on April 26, 2000; and \$4,528.32 on April 28, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,591.01 between April 29, 2000 and May 2, 2000.
- 22. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$6,586.49 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between May 3, 2000 and June 19, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$2,238.14 on May 3 &

4, 2000, and \$5,238.14 between May 5, 2000 and May 8, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,586.49 between May 9, 2000 and June 19, 2000.

- 23. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$6,336.49 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between June 20, 2000 and July 19, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,336.49 between June 20, 2000 and July 2, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$5,942.76 between July 3, 2000 and July 5, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,336.49 between July 6, 2000 and July 19, 2000.
- 24. Based upon respondent's client ledger for Cannon, he should have had \$6,318.49 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between July 20, 2000 and July 27, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,318.49 between July 20, 2000 and July 27, 2000.
- \$6,018.49 in his trust account on Cannon's behalf between July 28, 2000 and October 22, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,018.49 between July 28, 2000 and August 8, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$5,380.08 between August 9, 2000 and August 13, 2000, \$5,563.42 on August 14, 2000, \$4,463.42 on August 15, 2000, and

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\$3,934.67 on August 16, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,018.49 between August 17, 2000 and August 20, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$5,999.08 on August 21, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,018.49 between August 22, 2000 and August 27, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$4,312.08 on August 28, 2000, \$4,032.08 on August 29, 2000, \$3,975.57 on August 30, 2000, and \$4,339.27 between August 31, 2000 and September 2, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,018.49 between September 3, 2000 and September 19, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$2,014.18 between September 20, 2000 and September 21, 2000, \$1,952.78 between September 22, 2000 and September 25, 2000, \$1,802.78 between September 26, 2000 and September 28, 2000, and \$4,702.78 on September 29, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,018.49 between September 29, 2000 and October 2, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was \$5,847.78 between October 3, 2000 and October 4, 2000, \$5,786.78 on October 5, 2000, and \$5,256.20 on October 6, 2000. The balance in respondent's trust account was in excess of \$6,018.49 between October 7, 2000 and October 17, 2000.

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<sup>6</sup> See note 5, supra.

26. Respondent's failure to maintain sufficient funds in his trust account was a result of his failure to review individual client ledgers to determine the funds he was required to hold in trust.

27. Respondent's conduct, as set forth above, violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of the Supreme Court (including the Trust Account Guidelines promulgated pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 43(d)), as (a) respondent failed to hold property of clients or third persons follows: associated with his representation of one or more clients separate and apart from his personal funds, business funds and/or funds not associated with the representation of a client (i.e., respondent failed to hold in trust all the funds he was required by the rules to hold in trust); (b) respondent failed to keep complete records<sup>5</sup> of the funds that were placed into his client trust account; (c) respondent failed to maintain complete trust account records<sup>6</sup> of the handling, maintenance and disposition of all client funds that came into his possession at any time; (d) respondent failed to exercise due professional care in the performance of his duties under the Trust Account Guidelines promulgated pursuant to Rule 43(d). Ariz.R.S.Ct.; (e) respondent failed to have and/or use internal controls in his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For purposes of this agreement, the State Bar and respondent assert that "complete records" includes accurate records.

office that were adequate under the circumstances to safeguard funds or property held in trust; (f) respondent failed to promptly and completely record<sup>7</sup> all client trust account transactions; (g) respondent failed to create and/or maintain, on a current basis, records complying with ER 1.15 and the Trust Account Guidelines promulgated pursuant to Rule 43(d), Ariz.R.S.Ct.; (h) respondent failed to make all trust account disbursements by pre-numbered check; and (i) respondent failed to perform a monthly reconciliation of his trust account records (including his general register or check register, and individual client ledgers) and trust account bank statements.

28. Respondent's conduct, as set forth above, violated Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ER 1.15(a), Rule 43(a) & (d), Ariz.R.S.Ct. (Guidelines 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.c. and 2.e.), and Rule 44(b)3, Ariz.R.S.Ct.

# COUNT TWO (Prior Discipline)

Respondent has previously been sanctioned for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, in file number 86-1402, respondent received an informal reprimand by order signed June 23, 1992 (but filed June 24, 1992), for violation of ER 1.4; and in file numbers 90-1927 and 90-1639, respondent received an informal reprimand by order signed November 8, 1993 (but filed November 10, 1993), for violation of ER 1.8(a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See note 5, supra.

## **CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS**

Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct, as set forth above, violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of the Supreme Court:

ER 1.15(a) - 1 violation;

Rule 43(a), Ariz.R.S.Ct. - 1 violation;

Rule 43(d) (Guidelines 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.c., and 2.e.) -1 violation;

Rule 44(b)3, Ariz.R.S.Ct. – 1 violation.

## **SANCTIONS**

Respondent and the State Bar agree that based upon the conditional admissions contained herein, the following disciplinary sanctions will be imposed:

- 1. Respondent will receive a censure for violation of ER 1.15(a), Rule 43(a) & (d), Ariz.R.S.Ct. (Guidelines 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.c. and 2.e.), and Rule 44(b)3, Ariz.R.S.Ct.
- 2. Respondent will be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year.
  The terms of probation will be as follows:
  - a. Respondent will, within thirty (30) days of the issuance of a judgment and order by the Supreme Court of Arizona, contact the director of the Law Office Management Assistance

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Program (LOMAP) at the State Bar of Arizona to schedule a trust account review and an audit of his communication procedures and policies.8 The LOMAP director or her designee will complete a review of respondent's trust account and communication procedures and policies no later than ninety (90) days after issuance of a judgment and order by the Supreme Court of Arizona. Following that review, respondent agrees to comply with any and all recommendations of the LOMAP director or her designee and enter into a Memorandum of Understanding, which will include all recommendations made by the director or her designee, which may include but not be limited to: monthly or quarterly reports; periodic reviews by, or meetings with, the director or her designee; use of a practice monitor; and attendance at the Trust Account Ethics Enhancement Program;

b. Respondent will participate in fee arbitration with Sylvia

Cannon through the State Bar of Arizona Fee Arbitration

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Although respondent is not conditionally admitting to a violation of ER 1.4, he is aware that Cannon raised several concerns regarding his communication with her. Despite the lack of a conditional admission to a violation of ER 1.4, respondent is willing, as part of the resolution of this case, to be bound by a term of probation that will address his communication procedures and policies.

Program (if she files a petition for fee arbitration within three (3) months of the entry of the judgment and order by the Supreme Court of Arizona in this matter and the Program has jurisdiction):<sup>9</sup>

- Respondent will pay all costs and expenses associated with his participation in the LOMAP program.
- Respondent will pay all costs and expenses incurred in the disciplinary proceedings in this matter. Attached hereto is a statement of costs and expenses incurred by the State Bar in this disciplinary proceeding.
- 4. Restitution, if appropriate, will be addressed through the fee arbitration component of probation or in the context of the lawsuit that Cannon has filed against respondent.
- 5. In the event respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing terms, and information thereof is received by the State Bar, bar counsel will file a Notice of Non-Compliance with the hearing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The State Bar and respondent realize that the Fee Arbitration Program may not have jurisdiction due to a lawsuit that Cannon has filed against respondent. If any fee dispute has been, is or will be addressed in the context of that lawsuit, restitution is not an issue in this discipline proceeding.

officer previously assigned to this matter. <sup>10</sup> The hearing officer will conduct a hearing at the earliest practical date, but in no event later than thirty (30) days following receipt of said notice, to determine whether one or more terms of probation have been breached and, if so, to recommend an appropriate sanction. If the State Bar alleges that respondent failed to comply with any of the foregoing terms of probation, the burden of proof will be on the State Bar to prove non-compliance by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bar counsel has spoken with Cannon, who believes respondent should be disbarred or suspended for a period of at least one year. Cannon would also like additional funds and file documents and materials to be provided to her. This consent agreement does not require compliance with those requests, in part because the State Bar believes it is unable to prove violation of the ethical rules related to those requests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Although Rule 52(a)6.C., Ariz.R.S.Ct., states that the report shall be to the "imposing entity," the Arizona Supreme Court and this Commission have previously ordered that such report be filed with the previously assigned hearing officer. See, e.g., Matter of McAlister, SB-02-0123-D (Disc. Comm. Nos. 00-1720 & 01-0464) (2002).

Respondent conditionally admits he engaged in the conduct set forth above, and the rule violations indicated, in exchange for the form of discipline set forth above.

Respondent, by entering into this agreement, waives his right to a formal disciplinary hearing that he would otherwise be entitled to pursuant to Rule 53(c)(6), Ariz.R.S.Ct., and the right to testify and present witnesses on his behalf at a hearing. Respondent further waives all motions, defenses, objections or requests that he has made or raised, or could assert hereafter, if the conditional admissions and stated forms of discipline are approved. Respondent has chosen not to seek the assistance of counsel in these proceedings, but acknowledges that he has read this agreement and received a copy of it. Respondent submits this agreement with conditional admissions freely and voluntarily, and without coercion or intimidation, and is aware of the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline.

This tender of admissions and agreement for discipline by consent will be submitted to the Disciplinary Commission for review and approval. Respondent realizes that the Disciplinary Commission may request his presence at a hearing for presentation of evidence and/or oral argument in support of this agreement. Respondent further recognizes that the Disciplinary Commission may recommend rejection of this agreement, and that the Arizona Supreme Court may


accept or reject the Commission's recommendation. Respondent further understands that if this agreement is rejected at any time, his conditional admissions are withdrawn. This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation. I am aware of the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline and reinstatement. DATED this 27 day of December, 2002 Harry P. Friedlander Respondent DATED this  $27^{+4}$  day of December, 2002. Senior Bar Counsel

Approved as to form and content:

Robert B. Van Wyck Chief Bar Counsel

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk this 30<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2002.

1	Copies of the foregoing mailed
2	this 30 had day of December, 2002, to:
3	Harry P. Friedlander
4	Gibson Matheson Lalliss & Friedlander 1837 South Mesa Drive, Suite C-100
5	Mesa, Arizona 85210-6219
6	Respondent
7	Copies of the foregoing hand-delivered this 30 day of
8	December, 2002, to:
9	Lawyer Regulation Records Manager
10	State Bar of Arizona 111 W. Monroe, Suite 1800
11	Phoenix, Arizona 85003
12	by: llving hemr
13	IDL:es mn
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### BEFORE THE PROBABLE CAUSE PANELIST

#### OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA	,
HARRY P. FRIEDLANDER, Bar No 005244	

Respondent.

No. 00-2172

PROBABLE CAUSE ORDER

The Probable Cause Panelist of the State Bar, having reviewed this matter pursuant to Rule 53(b), Ariz.R.S.Ct., finds that probable cause exists to issue a complaint against respondent for violations of Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., including but not limited to ER 1.15(a) & (b), ER 1.16(d), Rule 43(a) & (d) (Guidelines 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.c. and 2.e.), and Rule 44(b)3 & 4, Ariz.R.S.Ct.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State Bar prepare and file a complaint with the Disciplinary Clerk.

DATED this 21 day of June

Pamela A. Treadwell-Rubin Probable Cause Panelist State Bar of Arizona

Copies mailed/hand-delivered this \_\_/\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_, 2002, to:


Harry P. Friedlander Attorney at Law

1837 S. Mesa Drive, Suite C-100

Mesa, AZ 85210

JDI/mn

James D. Lee, Bar No. 011586 Senior Bar Counsel State Bar of Arizona 111 West Monroe, Suite 1800 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-1742 Telephone (602) 340-7247



# BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,	) No. 00-2172 )
HARRY P. FRIEDLANDER, No. 005244	<ul> <li>JOINT MEMORANDUM IN</li> <li>SUPPORT OF AGREEMENT</li> <li>FOR DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT</li> </ul>
Respondent.	)

The State Bar of Arizona, which is represented by undersigned bar counsel, and respondent, who is not represented by counsel, hereby submit this Joint Memorandum in support of the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed contemporaneously herewith.

## **CONDUCT**

As reflected in the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent, respondent's misconduct involved violations of the Supreme Court Rules and Trust Account Guidelines, all of which pertained to the operation of his trust account. Respondent conditionally admits the facts as set forth in the Tender of Admissions.

## SANCTIONS

Respondent agrees to accept the following as the appropriate sanctions in this matter: censure, one (1) year of probation (including participation in fee arbitration, if appropriate, and the State Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP)), and payment of the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. Restitution, if appropriate, will be addressed through the fee arbitration component of probation. The State Bar and respondent believe these sanctions are appropriate under the circumstances.

In determining the appropriate sanctions, the State Bar considered both the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereafter "Standards") and Arizona case law.

## American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

The A.B.A. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. The Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Commission are consistent in utilizing the Standards to determine appropriate sanctions for attorney discipline. In re Kaplan, 179 Ariz. 175, 877 P.2d 274 (1994).

Standard 4.12 states, "Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client." Standard 4.13 states, "Reprimand

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[censure in Arizona] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client." Standard 4.14 states, "Admonition [informal reprimand in Arizona] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client."

The facts of this case implicate all three of the above Standards. Respondent was negligent in failing to maintain complete trust account records. Had he complied with the trust account rules and Guidelines, he would have realized he was dealing improperly with client property (i.e., respondent "should have known" that he was dealing improperly with client property). Finally, respondent's non-compliance with the trust account rules and Guidelines subjected his clients to potential harm. In this case, however, no client suffered actual harm because respondent returned the unused funds to Sylvia Cannon ("Cannon") shortly after his representation of her ended.

An analysis of the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors is also necessary. A review of Standard 9.22 reveals that the following aggravating factors are present:

1. Standard 9.22(a), prior disciplinary offenses. Respondent received an informal reprimand in 1992 for violation of ER 1.4, and an informal reprimand in 1993 for violation of ER 1.8(a). Those prior sanctions should be given very little

weight because the prior sanctions were not based upon improper conduct involving respondent's trust account and are remote in time from the misconduct in the instant matter.

- 2. Standard 9.22(c), a pattern of misconduct. The pattern of misconduct is based on the fact that for a period of several months the balance in respondent's trust account was less than he was required to hold on Cannon's behalf. That indicates that respondent failed to conduct a monthly reconciliation of his trust account records and the trust account bank statements for a relatively extended period of time.
- 3. Standard 9.22(d), multiple offenses. See discussion above regarding Standard 9.22(c).
- 4. Standard 9.22(h), vulnerability of the victim. Sylvia Cannon was vulnerable to the extent that she had no control over respondent's handling of the funds she had provided to him.
- 5. Standard 9.22(i), substantial experience in the practice of law.

  Respondent was admitted to practice law in Arizona on April 22, 1978, but was admitted in Illinois in 1974 and in Virginia and the District of Columbia in 1962.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Supreme Court of Arizona has stated that "[a] victim's vulnerability turn's not on a person's educational background or work experience, but rather on the situation." *In re Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 69, 876 P.2d 548, \_\_\_\_ (1994).

- 1. Standard 9.32(b), absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. There is no evidence that respondent knowingly or intentionally "misappropriated" Cannon's funds; rather, respondent's "temporary misappropriation" of Cannon's funds was a result of negligence.
- 2. Standard 9.32(d), timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of his misconduct. Respondent returned the unearned and unused funds to Cannon on or about October 17, 2000 (which was one day before the State Bar received the initial charges of misconduct from Cannon).
- 3. Standard 9.32(e), full and free disclosure to a disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings. Respondent not only responded to bar counsel's inquiries during the screening investigation, but also informed bar counsel very early in the investigation that he wanted to resolve this case prior to the filing of a formal complaint. In addition, respondent cooperated with bar counsel in negotiating this consent agreement.
- 4. Standard 9.32(g), character or reputation. Respondent intends to file letters with the Disciplinary Commission prior to oral argument regarding his good character and reputation.

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5. <u>Standard 9.32(1)</u>, remorse. Respondent regrets his failure to comply with all the trust account rules and Guidelines, and is willing to incorporate procedures that will ensure future compliance.

6. <u>Standard 9.32(m)</u>, remoteness of the prior offenses. Respondent's prior informal reprimands were imposed in 1992 and 1993.

Non-A.B.A. factors to consider in mitigation include the following: (1) the prior informal reprimands were imposed for violations of ER 1.4 and ER 1.8(a), both of which are unrelated to the violations in this matter; (2) respondent has received a State Bar award for being among the top fifty pro bono lawyers in Arizona; (3) respondent will soon receive the Family Law—Lawyer of the Year award from the Volunteer Lawyers Program; (4) respondent has voluntarily represented at least seven clients through the Volunteer Lawyers Program of the State Bar: (5) respondent has chosen to provide pro bono services to a woman in an effort to help her obtain a settlement in a case involving an automobile repossession; (6) respondent started a "Law Help" program at his church for which he receives no fee (respondent refers valid cases to other lawyers); (7) respondent is the Arizona District Governor of the Sertoma Club, a service organization; (8) respondent is a Eucharistic minister at his church; (9) respondent has had difficulty finding competent secretarial assistance during the past two years (various secretaries failed to follow respondent's instructions and failed to respond to

clients, as directed); (10) respondent has recently reduced the number of active clients he has at any one time and now limits the type of cases he will accept (e.g., respondent no longer accepts medical malpractice cases); (11) respondent has promised bar counsel that he will now begin sending monthly status letters to his clients, even if it is only to advise that there is nothing new to report; and (12) respondent has improved his clients' ability to communicate with him by telephone (e.g., respondent now has a cellular phone that he answers after regular office hours and while he is away from his office; in divorce cases, respondent provides his home telephone number to his clients; and respondent will soon begin sending written confirmation of all telephone calls with clients).

# Proportionality Analysis

The Arizona Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Commission have previously addressed conduct similar in nature to that in the instant matter.

In Matter of Niemeir, SB-01-0194-D (2002), attorney Thomas Niemeir was censured and placed on two years probation for making nineteen withdrawals of unearned funds from his trust account, totaling \$20,609.00, over a nine and a half month period. The Disciplinary Commission determined that suspension was the presumptive sanction, but reduced the sanction to a censure after finding the presence of seven ABA mitigating factors, but only two ABA aggravating factors.

See also In re Van Baalen, SB-01-0160-D (2001) (presumptive sanction of

suspension in a trust account case was reduced to a censure, primarily as a result of "substantial" mitigation).

Although the presumptive sanction in the instant matter may be suspension, mitigating factors warrant the imposition of a censure and one year of probation.

In Matter of Hall, SB-02-0122-D (2002), attorney Dennis Hall received a censure and one year probation for failing to adequately protect his clients' funds and using one client's funds to make payments of costs for other clients, failing to keep his personal or business funds separate from his clients' funds, failing to use a pre-numbered check on every occasion, and failing to maintain adequate trust account records. The Disciplinary Commission found the existence of six mitigating factors and only one aggravating factor.

In the instant case, respondent failed to adequately protect his client's funds, failed to use a pre-numbered trust account check on very occasion, and failed to adequately review his trust account records to determine that client funds were being compromised.

A review of *In re Lancaster*, SB-01-0119-D (2001), is also useful. For a period of five months, attorney Wendy Lancaster withdrew funds from her trust account prior to earning those funds, disbursed trust account funds on behalf of clients for whom she had no funds in trust, and failed to maintain accurate trust account records. Lancaster received a censure and one-year probation. The only

factor in aggravation was pattern of misconduct, while there were seven factors in mitigation.

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Respondent in the instant matter, as a result of negligence, withdrew funds that should have remained in his trust account and failed to maintain accurate trust account records. Just as in *Lancaster*, the mitigating factors in the instant case outnumber the aggravating factors.

In Matter of West, SB-02-0143-D (2002), attorney David West failed to keep disputed funds in his trust account until the dispute was resolved. On ten occasions in three non-consecutive months, the balance in West's trust account fell below the disputed amount. West, however, would have testified that he instructed his secretary to keep the disputed funds in his trust account at all times. In West, there were two ABA aggravating factors (prior discipline and substantial experience in the practice of law) and four ABA mitigating factors.

Although West instructed a member of his staff to ensure that he maintained a trust account balance that adequately protected all clients, he had the same responsibility to protect his clients that respondent had in the instant matter (i.e., maintain proper trust account records and review them to assure that all clients' funds are protected). Despite the differences between West's conduct and respondent's conduct, a censure and probation are appropriate in this case.

The Supreme Court has also imposed a censure in a case where a lawyer failed to maintain adequate trust account records, issued trust account checks against funds that had not yet been transferred into his account, failed to deposit client funds intact into his trust account, failed to always use pre-numbered checks to make withdrawals from his trust account, failed to reconcile his trust account on a monthly basis, and deposited earned funds into his trust account. *Matter of Randall*, SB-02-0146-D (2002). There were five ABA mitigating factors one ABA aggravating factor present in *Randall*.

Respondent's conduct was similar to that which Randall engaged in and he should, therefore, receive the same sanction that Randall received.

Attorney Russell Zarkou was suspended for thirty days, in part for depositing client funds into his general operating account, rather than his client trust fund, and allowing the balance in his trust account to drop below that required by the Supreme Court rules and the Trust Account Guidelines. *Matter of Zarkou*, SB-02-0059-D (2002). Zarkou also failed to promptly remit funds to his client and failed to maintain proper trust account records. The Disciplinary Commission found that Zarkou's conduct amounted to conversion and misappropriation of client funds for a period of five months. The Commission found one aggravating factor and two mitigating factors present.

In the instant case, respondent converted client funds on a number of occasions in varying amounts. Although Zarkou failed to cooperate completely with the State Bar during the disciplinary proceedings, respondent herein has cooperated fully with the State Bar. Another factor distinguishing the instant case from Zarkou is the fact that Zarkou failed to submit a timely disclosure statement, failed to timely answer non-uniform interrogatories, and failed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested by the hearing officer.

Although respondent in the instant matter has two prior informal reprimands, they should be given very little or no weight because they were not based on conduct related to respondent's handling of his trust account and they are remote in time from the misconduct in the instant case. In the instant case, there are numerous mitigating factors present (both ABA factors and non-ABA factors), whereas the Commission found only two mitigating factors in *Zarkou*. Based upon respondent's cooperation in these disciplinary proceedings and the greater number of mitigating factors present in the instant case, a censure, rather than a 30-day suspension, is appropriate.

See also Matter of Odneal, SB-01-0108-D (2001) (negligent conduct, some of which pertained to Odneal's failure to promptly return unearned trust funds to two clients, resulted in imposition of censure and one year of probation).

## **CONCLUSION**

Based upon the ABA Standards and relevant case law, the State Bar and respondent believe that imposition of censure, probation and payment of the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings is appropriate. Even if the presumptive sanction is suspension, the facts indicate that a mitigated sanction of censure and probation is warranted.

The Court and the Disciplinary Commission have repeatedly stated that the purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the offender but to protect the public, the profession, and the administration of justice. *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1988). The imposition of a censure, one (1) year of probation, and payment of the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings will accomplish those goals. There was no actual harm to any client and the Arizona Supreme Court disfavors suspensions of less than six months. See *In re Alcorn*, SB-01-0075-D (2002) (citing and quoting the A.B.A. *Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions*), and thirty-day suspensions are often disruptive and costly to the lawyer's clients. Probation with the terms set forth above will protect the public and ensure future compliance by respondent.

For all of the above reasons, respondent and the State Bar respectfully request the Disciplinary Commission to accept this Agreement for Discipline by Consent.

DATED this 27 day of December, 2002. Harry P. Friedlander Respondent DATED this 27th day of December, 2002. Senior Bar Counsel Approved as to form and content: Robert B. Van Wy Chief Bar Counsel Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk this 30<sup>14</sup> day of December, 2002. Copies of the foregoing mailed this 30th day of December, 2002, to: Harry P. Friedlander Gibson Matheson Lalliss & Friedlander 1837 South Mesa Drive, Suite C-100 Mesa, Arizona 85210-6219 Respondent

Copies of the foregoing hand-delivered this 30 day of December, 2002, to:

Lawyer Regulation Records Manager State Bar of Arizona
111 W. Monroe, Suite 1800
Phoenix, Arizona 85003

by: